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In February 2009 the House of Lords Constitutional Committee in the United Kingdom published the 
report Surveillance: Citizens and the State. Some have hailed this as a landmark document. Volume 6(3) 
of Surveillance & Society published 4 invited responses to this report written by prominent scholars. In the 
contribution below the two Specialist Advisers to this committee set the context for the report and provide 
a brief rejoinder to the four responses. 
 
As the Specialist Advisers to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution for its report, 
Surveillance: Citizens and the State,1 we are grateful for the opportunity to respond to the commentaries 
published by Oscar Gandy, Katherine Hayles, Katja Franko Aas and Mark Andrejevic in Surveillance and 
Society, 6(3) 2009. We write in our academic and personal capacities, and not as representatives of the 
Committee. 
 
We welcome the contributions made by the four commentators, not only because they give the report 
currency in circles beyond parliament and government, but also because their observations are extremely 
well informed and thought-provoking. Although the Committee was very concerned to ensure that the 
report would be accessible to lay readers, we believe that it should also be of great interest to surveillance 
scholars, privacy advocates, and civil liberties organisations. As such, we were heartened to read that all 
four commentators felt that the report makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of 
surveillance and data collection, and that it raises important questions and concerns. Yet while we agree 
wholeheartedly with many of the commentators’ comments and criticisms, we believe that some of them 
are also misplaced, and perhaps reflect an understandable lack of knowledge of how parliamentary 
inquiries are carried out in the UK. This is hardly surprising given that the inquiry process is not an 
especially transparent one, and that committee reports do not typically contain anything like a 
                                                      
1 Second Report of Session 2008-09, HL Paper 18-I. The Government’s response is Cm 7616 (13 May 2009); the Committee’s 
reply is Fourteenth Report of Session 2008-09, HL Paper 114; the debate is House of Lords Official Report, Vol. 711, No. 93, 19 
June 2009, cols. 1285-1312.  
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“methodology section.” As a consequence, it is perhaps helpful to begin this response with a description 
of the general inquiry process, and the steps that lead to the eventual publication of committee reports.  
 
Inquiries undertaken by British parliamentary committees vary considerably in their length, breadth and 
depth. In general, they provide an opportunity for small sections of parliament to examine issues by 
gathering and analysing evidence, discussing relevant concerns and questions, and making 
recommendations to the Government or other bodies. This process is not intended to be comprehensive, 
nor are the reports produced by such inquiries meant to be a definitive account of the subject in question. 
In most cases, a degree of selectivity has to be exercised from the very start, and throughout the inquiry 
itself. As a result, there is always a danger that – in hindsight – the terms of reference for an inquiry may 
appear to have been drawn too narrowly or too broadly. It is important to note that it is not the aim of 
parliamentary committees to produce highly detailed, academic research studies. Whilst their reports may 
speak to knowledgeable specialists in the field, they must also anticipate interest from government 
ministers, politicians, officials and others who are involved in the relevant policy community, as well from 
as a wider audience including the media, civil society, and the public-at-large. In essence, committee 
reports are political documents, not scholarly treatises or opinion pieces. As a consequence, their influence 
and effectiveness depends on how they are received by policy-makers and parliament, and on whether 
they manage to capture the interest of the media and general public. Given that the Government is not 
obliged to accept the recommendations of a committee report, their success is highly dependent on how 
they are received and, to a large extent, on the direction of the political wind at the time they are 
published. 
 
Committees of each House are made up of sitting members, who typically serve for a period of a few 
years. In the case of the Select Committee on the Constitution, there are twelve members who spend the 
majority of their time scrutinising bills and secondary legislation, questioning ministers and judicial 
figures (such as the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice), and considering the constitutional 
implications of new policies and legislative proposals, such as the European Union’s Treaty of Lisbon and 
planned changes to the role of the Attorney General. In addition to these routine functions, parliamentary 
committees can also undertake inquiries into specific matters, the length and scope of the inquiry being 
relatively flexible. Given the range of functions carried out by these committees, however, any inquiry 
will only form part of the overall agenda, and as such must compete for time with the committee’s other 
responsibilities. 
 
The level of interest shown by individual committee members in any given inquiry, and the extent of their 
prior knowledge of the particular issues, will naturally enough vary considerably depending on the subject 
under scrutiny. While members of the House of Lords and its committees are in most respects less party-
political than in the House of Commons (in which some of them previously served), it is rare for them to 
speak with one voice or reach the same conclusion during the course of an inquiry. Given that convention 
requires a committee’s report to reflect a consensus of views, during the course of drafting there will be 
considerable discussion before any final recommendations are agreed upon. Following publication, the 
report will then be the subject of a formal Government response, a debate on the floor of the House, and 
possibly discussion in the mainstream media. Members are, therefore, very conscious of the fact that the 
report must be focused, comprehensible, and sufficiently trenchant to command respect and require the 
attention of those to whom its recommendations are principally addressed.  
 
Surveillance: Citizens and the State is a comparatively lengthy parliamentary report, and it includes a 
large volume of written and oral evidence gathered over some twenty months. This is a long period for a 
committee to remain engaged and interested in a topic, and was considerably longer than anticipated. 
Because all of the recommendations made in a parliamentary report must be justified by reference to the 
evidence taken directly (and only sometimes indirectly) by the committee, it is inevitable that the scope of 
those recommendations will be somewhat limited. In particular, the emphasis on the need for direct 
evidence means that it rarely possible for a committee to look for additional evidence once the drafting the 
report is underway. Equally, it is difficult for a committee to consider issues that may have emerged once 
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the inquiry has been concluded but before the final report has been published, even if they are topical or 
relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. Committees are also usually very conscious of the danger of 
delaying publication of their findings. Aside from the fact that the longer the gap between the conclusion 
of an inquiry and publication of the report the more likely it is that the evidence and findings will be 
overtaken by events, changes in the composition of the committee or the political fashions of the day may 
also lessen its impact. As a consequence, an inquiry cannot be expected to do everything, or to do 
everything equally well. This is not to say that parliamentary reports are fated to fall short, or that falling 
short necessarily undermines their value. Whether or not they “fall short” depends, of course, on the 
standard employed; as indicated earlier, we believe that an ideal academic standard – itself only 
sometimes fully met – would be inappropriate if applied to a parliamentary inquiry. What is important is 
that the inquiry helps to move a particular issue into the political spotlight, and increases the chance that 
policy-makers will place it on their list of areas for consideration and reform. 
 
A crucial determinant of the scope of this inquiry was the fact that the Committee had to focus on the 
constitutional implications of surveillance and data processing. In practice, this meant that the Committee 
had to confine itself to the question of whether the growth of surveillance and data collection had led to 
any significant change in the constitutional landscape of the UK, or posed any threat to the relationship 
between the government and the parliament, or between citizens and the state. Given that the UK lacks a 
written constitution, there will almost always be some uncertainty associated with the framing of the 
“constitutional questions” that should form the basis of any such inquiry. In addition, the Committee must 
always be careful to ensure that it does not intrude upon the remit of other parliamentary committees, or 
frame its terms of reference in such a way as to imply that it has granted itself some sort of roving brief. 
The Committee was also, understandably, restricted to considering the situation in the United Kingdom. 
However, it was interested in learning lessons from comparable overseas jurisdictions, and as such took 
evidence from foreign experts and undertook a research trip to Canada and the United States.  
 
Advisers to inquiries are typically drawn from the academic world, although in some cases they may be 
experts or practitioners from the private sector. It is important to note that the role of the adviser is an 
unusual one, and not akin to a project’s principal investigator or a contract researcher. The main roles of 
the adviser – and in this case, we were the Specialist Adviser and Specialist Legal Adviser respectively – 
are to help select witnesses, formulate questions for evidence sessions, collate and analyse the evidence, 
and to draft the final report in conjunction with the clerks to the Committee. Of course, this somewhat 
bland textbook description of the role of the adviser does not tell the whole story. Like the “anonymous” 
parliamentary clerks who work throughout Westminster, the convention is that advisers are just that – 
individuals who serve the Committee, and who should only offer their professional opinions when 
specifically called upon to do so. As former advisers, we are unfortunately not in a position to say much 
more about our roles, or to reveal the confidential deliberations of the Committee.  
 
We hope this brief explanation of how parliamentary inquiries are conducted will help to shed new light 
on the strengths and limitations of the House of Lords Surveillance report. When all goes well – and the 
political winds are blowing in the right direction – reports can have a marked influence on policy 
development, albeit often in unexpected and subtle ways. That the influence of such reports is often 
indirect and incremental, however, also says as much about the process of policy-making as it does about 
the system of parliamentary inquiries. In any event, we hope that anyone reading between the lines of this 
explanation may find an answer to some of the charges that have been levelled at the report, both by our 
commentators in Surveillance & Society and by others in the academic, political, and NGO communities. 
We now turn to the four individual contributions. It is important to note that we do not intend to say 
anything substantive about the subject of surveillance, although we agree that there is scope for 
developing a more detailed analysis of the regulation of surveillance in the UK and elsewhere. Equally, 
we do not attempt to respond to all of the issues raised by the commentators, but instead confine ourselves 
to those we found the most challenging and thought-provoking.  
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We share Oscar Gandy’s concern that various forms of surveillance might have discriminatory effects. We 
have argued elsewhere2 that an undue focus on an individualistic, rights-based paradigm of privacy can 
draw attention away from the negative effects of surveillance on certain social groups. Although the report 
acknowledges and illustrates this point, it is true that the issue of discrimination is not systematically 
explored across the board. As regards the question of surveillance-driven discrimination in the private 
sector, and the dangers associated with commercialisation of transaction and personal data, Gandy is also 
right to say that this is a serious problem about which the report says little. Instead, the report explores 
these issues in a general sense, restricting itself to a broad discussion of the potential problems associated 
with data collection and sharing in the public sector. Although we cannot comment on how the Committee 
chose to focus on some things and not others, it is clear that this limitation is in part a product of the need 
to “stick to the evidence” mentioned earlier, and in part a reflection of the focus upon the constitutional 
implications of information-processing developments in the state, rather than the effects of commercial 
practices. The Committee took very little evidence on this topic: while a few witnesses drew attention to 
the dangers of discrimination, none was in a position to provide a systematic account of the problem. As a 
consequence, it would have been difficult for the report to make specific recommendations on this point. 
Aside from the fact that hindsight is a wonderful thing – one could argue that more should have been done 
to solicit empirical evidence on this important subject – it is important to note that Committee received 
only fragmentary written submissions and oral evidence on the question of discrimination. In light of this, 
it is possible to argue that the report – perhaps inadvertently – highlights a pressing need for more 
empirical research in this area. While surveillance scholars have been plausibly arguing for many years 
that surveillance can be discriminatory, there is in fact rather little systematic, empirical evidence 
available in support of this claim about the effects of certain information practices. If policy-makers are to 
take this problem more seriously, they will need more to go on than theories or a patchwork of relatively 
small research case studies.  
 
In contrast to Gandy, Katherine Hayles commends the report for recommending that the Information 
Commissioner be given stronger powers to inspect private-sector data processing. We agree that 
recognising that privacy can be a social good, and not just an individual right, is highly desirable. The 
report is not, however, anchored in the “right to be let alone” formulation of Warren and Brandeis, and 
recognises that such a definition is too concise and too limited. Instead, the Committee found Calcutt’s 
suggestion that privacy is best viewed as an individual right against intrusion very “helpful,” if not 
necessarily definitive. Yet while it is true that the report does not explore alternative conceptual 
approaches, it is because there seemed to be little to be gained in chasing after definitions, or in trying 
somehow to end the debate over the meaning of privacy. Her inventory of what “privacy” means – the 
presumption of freedom from overlooking, control over our own data, and the observance of 
private/public spatial boundaries – is, we think, encompassed by the report, although the part played by 
these elements in a conceptualisation of privacy is not straightforward.3 The report also approaches the 
idea of “surveillance” in largely neutral terms, noting that surveillance has both costs and benefits, and 
that the key question is how best to regulate such activity in line with demands of the law, the 
constitutional framework of the UK, and public expectations. In addition, the report recognises the 
importance of ensuring that surveillance activities are carried out in accordance with emerging human 
rights principles, such as the tests of necessity and proportionality. According to the report, existing 
privacy regulations are an established part of the legal landscape that could, if effectively strengthened and 
repositioned, both bolster individual rights and – as Hayles suggests – help advance the cause of the 
disadvantaged and society more generally.  
 
                                                      
2 Bennett, C.J. and Raab, C.D. 2006. The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press; Goold, B.J. 2009. Surveillance and the Political Value of Privacy. Amsterdam Law Forum 1(4), 
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/  
3 Solove, D.J. 2002. Conceptualizing Privacy. California Law Review 90: 1087-1155; Nissenbaum, H. 2004. Privacy as 
Contextual Integrity. Washington Law Review 79: 101-39. 
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Although Hayles is right that that the potential implications of radio-frequency identification (RFID) 
deserve to be more fully discussed, given that the report could not address every concern equally, it is 
understandable that this particular topic did not receive more attention. As ubiquitous computing, ambient 
intelligence, and nanotechnologies are still emerging areas, they are perhaps less urgently in need of 
political and constitutional consideration than established technologies like CCTV, data mining, and DNA 
profiling. More importantly, they are also highly technical areas of interest that lie well outside the 
expertise and resources of a Committee appointed to focus on legal and constitutional matters. Hopefully, 
however, these are topics that will soon be taken-up by parliamentary committees specifically devoted to 
scientific and technological developments. That said, the report’s recommendations for privacy impact 
assessment might promote serious scrutiny of the problems these technologies may pose for individuals 
and society before they are applied. 
 
Turning to the comments of Katja Franko Aas, it is difficult to know how to respond to the complaint that 
the report suffers from a form of “methodological nationalism.” Given that the report is the product of a 
parliamentary committee, it is hardly surprising that it is primarily (although not exclusively) concerned 
with surveillance and data collection in the UK. To criticise the report for being overly parochial, 
therefore, is perhaps a little unfair. Equally, although the question of whether the UK is an “anomalous 
surveillance outlier” is an important one, it would have been extremely difficult for the Committee to 
address this question in any meaningful way without devoting a great deal of its (very limited) time to a 
detailed comparative analysis of the social and political dimensions of surveillance in a wide range of 
countries. Although the report does spend some time drawing comparisons with policies and practices in 
other countries, even in the context of a relatively long inquiry these comparisons could only ever be 
illustrative.  As regards the question of cross-border flows of personal information, this is an issue that has 
been considered by a number of other parliamentary committees – that have produced reports on 
EUROPOL, FRONTEX, the Prüm Treaty, and the Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement. As a 
consequence, the Constitution Committee was keen to avoid returning to ground that had already been 
recently covered. While Aas is right that the report is “silent” as to the surveillance of non-citizens, it can 
be argued that this reflects a failure to disaggregate more generally rather than a desire to ignore the 
specific problems facing non-nationals. As Aas acknowledges, the report does in fact note that certain 
groups – such as children – are especially vulnerable to forms of discrimination resulting from data 
collection and processing, and that surveillance is not experienced uniformly by all individuals or groups 
in society.  
 
Although we do not think that Aas was suggesting some malign motive, the claim that foreign citizens 
were “systematically” omitted from discussion is not one that bears any serious scrutiny. Moreover, we 
are not convinced that the report adopts an orthodox “surveillance threatens freedom” approach, or that 
“the standard liberal language of freedom and individual self-determination” is no longer potent in terms 
of law and regulation. Although surveillance’s potential for social sorting, exclusion and discrimination 
should never be ignored, given that the report was concerned to explore the constitutional implications of 
surveillance and its effects on the relationship between the citizen and the state, it is little wonder that it 
spends considerable time on issues of individual freedom and, in particular, the problem of how best to 
regulate the use of state power. 
 
We are similarly puzzled by Mark Andrejevic’s reading of the report, and in particular his charge that it 
falls prey to a simplistic “freedom/liberty v. surveillance” view of the issues. Contrary to his suggestion, 
the report is far from reductive, and goes to considerable length to avoid such hackneyed narratives. If 
anything, Andrejevic’s criticism seems to be based on the use of terms like “freedom” and “liberty” in the 
media’s coverage of the report, and in letters written to newspapers like The Times. The Constitution 
Committee cannot, of course, be held responsible for the fact that some commentators have used the 
report and its critique of surveillance as an excuse to stir up animosity towards the current Government or 
the state more generally. In any case, it is worth noting that The Guardian – a centre left publication – has 
been at the forefront of campaigns against the erosion of liberties attributable to excessive state 
surveillance, and has published many letters in support of the Committee’s general conclusions. Further, 
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we are not sure whether Andrejevic’s remark about the “simplified neo-libertarian equation of state 
monitoring with authoritarianism” is intended to refer to the report, although the context in which it arises 
suggests that it is. If so, this suggests a somewhat surprising misreading of the report. As mentioned 
earlier, the report is not inherently hostile to surveillance, nor does it blithely assume that particular types 
of surveillance are necessarily good or bad. Instead, it acknowledges a tension between the state’s demand 
for more surveillance and monitoring, and the need to ensure that surveillance systems operate in 
accordance with established democratic values.  
 
Andrejevic also regards the report’s failure to examine the “privatization of interactive spaces” as a 
surprising “blind spot.” We are not entirely clear what distinctions, if any, he is drawing between 
problems caused by specific invasions of privacy and those caused by the more general, commercial 
surveillance practices of the private sector. Nonetheless, he asks a number of important questions – about 
appropriate levels of targeting and the need for public policy to determine how autonomy can be 
safeguarded – which deserve attention. However, we are not certain that “collective autonomy,” with its 
overtones of privacy as a social good, is the best term to describe regulatory policy in this field. 
Furthermore, this is a subject that has already been tackled in national, sub-national and international 
policy arenas for about 40 years; it does not require a parliamentary report to reinforce the need for policy 
solutions. 
 
As noted at the outset, we are pleased that all four commentators find much that is good in the report and 
appear to believe that, despite its flaws and limitations, it makes a contribution to the surveillance debate. 
For readers of and contributors to Surveillance & Society, we share Aas’ hope that the report will 
“function as a backdrop for self-reflection…to the growing field of surveillance studies.” We also agree 
with Andrejevic that the report’s call to schools, learned societies and voluntary organisations to engage in 
public discussion of the risks and benefits of surveillance is an important one. It is also our hope that the 
report will provide a touchstone for privacy advocates and NGOs concerned about privacy and human 
rights. By asserting that “privacy and the principle of restraint in the use of surveillance and data 
collection powers are central to individual freedom,”4 the report rightly identifies privacy as essential to 
the proper functioning of the state, and to the maintenance of a healthy relationship between the powers of 
government and the needs of the governed. Although the present government may not act on all – or 
indeed the majority – of the recommendations contained in the report, by helping to place issues of 
surveillance and privacy more clearly on the political map, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, we 
believe, represents an substantial contribution to an important debate, and should provide a solid 
foundation for progressive policy-making and law reform for years to come. 
 
  
                                                      
4 Second Report of Session 2008-09, HL Paper 18-I, paragraph 13. 
